Differential Games and Nonlinear First Order PDE on Bounded Domains.
Discrepancy games.
Discrete and nondiscrete duels
Discrete bidding games.
Discrete stochastic processes, replicator and Fokker-Planck equations of coevolutionary dynamics in finite and infinite populations
Finite-size fluctuations in coevolutionary dynamics arise in models of biological as well as of social and economic systems. This brief tutorial review surveys a systematic approach starting from a stochastic process discrete both in time and state. The limit N → ∞ of an infinite population can be considered explicitly, generally leading to a replicator-type equation in zero order, and to a Fokker-Planck-type equation in first order in 1/√N. Consequences and relations to some previous approaches...
Discretized feedback for differential games
Disjointness of fuzzy coalitions
The cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions in which some players act in a coalition only with a fraction of their total “power” (endeavor, investments, material, etc.) or in which they can distribute their “power” in more coalitions, are connected with some formal or interpretational problems. Some of these problems can be avoided if we interpret each fuzzy coalition as a fuzzy class of crisp coalitions, as shown by Mareš and Vlach in [9,10,11]. The relation between this model of fuzziness and...
Distributed accelerated Nash equilibrium learning for two-subnetwork zero-sum game with bilinear coupling
This paper proposes a distributed accelerated first-order continuous-time algorithm for convergence to Nash equilibria in a class of two-subnetwork zero-sum games with bilinear couplings. First-order methods, which only use subgradients of functions, are frequently used in distributed/parallel algorithms for solving large-scale and big-data problems due to their simple structures. However, in the worst cases, first-order methods for two-subnetwork zero-sum games often have an asymptotic or convergence....
Division schemes under uncertainty of claims
In some economic or social division problems, we may encounter uncertainty of claims, that is, a certain amount of estate has to be divided among some claimants who have individual claims on the estate, and the corresponding claim of each claimant can vary within a closed interval or fuzzy interval. In this paper, we classify the division problems under uncertainty of claims into three subclasses and present several division schemes from the perspective of axiomatizations, which are consistent with...
Domination Game: Extremal Families for the 3/5-Conjecture for Forests
In the domination game on a graph G, the players Dominator and Staller alternately select vertices of G. Each vertex chosen must strictly increase the number of vertices dominated. This process eventually produces a dominating set of G; Dominator aims to minimize the size of this set, while Staller aims to maximize it. The size of the dominating set produced under optimal play is the game domination number of G, denoted by γg(G). Kinnersley, West and Zamani [SIAM J. Discrete Math. 27 (2013) 2090-2107]...
Duels with possibly asymmetric goals
Dynamic one-pile blocking Nim.
Dynamic Programming Principle for tug-of-war games with noise
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that...
Dynamic Programming Principle for tug-of-war games with noise
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that the value functions of this game satisfy the Dynamic Programming Principle...
Dynamic Programming Principle for tug-of-war games with noise
We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F. We give a detailed proof of the fact that...
Dynamic single-pile Nim using multiple bases.
Dynamic solution of general coalition-games
Dynamical Aspects of Evolutionary Stability.
Edge-disjoint odd cycles in graphs with small chromatic number
For a simple graph, we consider the minimum number of edges which block all the odd cycles and the maximum number of odd cycles which are pairwise edge-disjoint. When these two coefficients are equal, interesting consequences appear. Similar problems (but interchanging “vertex-disjoint odd cycles” and “edge-disjoint odd cycles”) have been considered in a paper by Berge and Fouquet.
Ein Beitrag zu den Kooperativen N-Personen-Spielen Ohne Seitenxahlungen. Ein Beispiel fuer die Machtverteilung in einer Aktiengesellschaft