On a Formulation of Discrete, N-Person Non Cooperative Games.
On a functional equation of Luce.
On a game of Sierpiński
On a game theoretical model of cooperative market
On a generalization of Meyniel's conjecture on the Cops and Robbers game.
On a modified game of Sierpiński
On a new solution concept for bargaining problems
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the properties of a new solution of the 2-person bargaining problem as formulated by Nash, the so-called Average Pay-off solution. This solution of a very simple form has a natural interpretation based on the center of gravity of the feasible set, and it is "more sensitive" to changes of feasible sets than any other standard bargaining solution. It satisfies the standard axioms: Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, Continuity and Twisting. Moreover,...
On a nonlinear differential game of evasion with constraints
On a problem of evasion
On approximations of nonzero-sum uniformly continuous ergodic stochastic games
We consider a class of uniformly ergodic nonzero-sum stochastic games with the expected average payoff criterion, a separable metric state space and compact metric action spaces. We assume that the payoff and transition probability functions are uniformly continuous. Our aim is to prove the existence of stationary ε-equilibria for that class of ergodic stochastic games. This theorem extends to a much wider class of stochastic games a result proven recently by Bielecki [2].
On bargaining in games
On Bellman systems without zero order term in the context of risk sensitive differential games
Bellman systems corresponding to stochastic differential games arising from a cost functional which models risk aspects are considered. Here it leads to diagonal elliptic systems without zero order term so that no simple -estimate is available.
On best proximity pair theorems and fixed-point theorems.
On Bilevel Variational Inequalities Arising in the Analysis of Improper Optimization Problems
On convex combinations of two values
We study values for cooperative TU-games which are convex combinations of the Shapley value and the solidarity value, introduced in our recent paper [1]. First, we axiomatize the convex combination of the two values in the case when the coefficients are given exogenously. Next, we give an axiomatic description of the whole family of such values.
On cooperative games connected with markets
On determining sets for the class of somewhat continuous functions
On existence of equilibrium pair for constrained generalized games.
On game ideals
On games of Topsoe.