Brève communication. Une méthode de résolution des problèmes de col
BSDEs with two reflecting barriers driven by a Brownian and a Poisson noise and related Dynkin game.
BV as a dual space
Calcul des probabilités et modélisation.
Callable Russian options and their optimal boundaries.
Caracterización de la función de valor de los juegos estocásticos continuos.
Se establece una caracterización de la función de valor de los juegos estocásticos continuos, similar a la contenida en [2] y [3] para juegos matriciales y en [4] para juegos estocásticos discretos. Tras la formulación del problema se señalan algunas propiedades de la función de valor. Más adelante se prueba que tales propiedades son suficientes para identificar el funcional que asigna a cada juego su valor.
Carrying umbrellas: An online relocation game on a graph.
Changes of the outcome of combinatorial games with differing number of prohibited repetitions
Chaos and control of game model based on heterogeneous expectations in electric power triopoly.
Characterization of σ-porosity via an infinite game
Let X be an arbitrary metric space and P be a porosity-like relation on X. We describe an infinite game which gives a characterization of σ-P-porous sets in X. This characterization can be applied to ordinary porosity above all but also to many other variants of porosity.
Classical hierarchies from a modern standpoint. Part II. R-sets
Coalitional fuzzy preferences
The paper deals with the concept of coalitional preferences in the group decision-making situations in which the agents and coalitions have only vague idea about the comparative acceptability of particular outcomes. The coalitional games with vague utilities (see, e. g., [6]) can serve for a good example when some types of the game solutions (e. g., the von Neumann– Morgenstern one) are to be extended to the fuzzy game case. In this paper, we consider the fuzzy analogies of coalitional preferences...
Coalitional stability and rationality in cooperative games
Cœur et nucléolus des jeux de recouvrement
Coeur et nucléolus des jeux de recouvrement
A cooperative game is defined as a set of players and a cost function. The distribution of the whole cost between the players can be done using the core concept, that is the set of all undominated cost allocations which prevent players from grouping. In this paper we study a game whose cost function comes from the optimal solution of a linear integer covering problem. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the core to be nonempty and characterize its allocations using linear programming...
Coevolutionary genetic algorithms for establishing Nash equilibrium in symmetric Cournot games.
Coincidence theorems for families of multimaps and their applications to equilibrium problems.
Colorings and nowhere-zero flows of graphs in terms of Berlekamp's switching game.
Colouring game and generalized colouring game on graphs with cut-vertices
For k ≥ 2 we define a class of graphs 𝓗 ₖ = {G: every block of G has at most k vertices}. The class 𝓗 ₖ contains among other graphs forests, Husimi trees, line graphs of forests, cactus graphs. We consider the colouring game and the generalized colouring game on graphs from 𝓗 ₖ.
Combinations and transformations of some general coalition-games