On the structure of Nash equilibrium sets in partially convex games.
On the structure of the core of balanced games
The uniform competitive solutions (u.c.s.) are basically stable sets of proposals involving several coalitions which are not necessarily disjoint. In the general framework of NTU games, the uniform competitive solutions have been defined in two earlier papers of the author (Stefanescu [5]) and Stefanescu [6]). The general existence results cover most situations formalized in the framework of the cooperative game theory, including those when the coalitional function is allowed to have empty values....
On the symmetry axiom for values of nonatomic games.
On three-rowed chomp.
On totally bounded games
On two combination rules for 0-1-sequences.
On two problems regarding the Hamiltonian cycle game.
On two-point Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with convexity properties
This paper considers bimatrix games with matrices having concavity properties. The games described by such payoff matrices well approximate two-person non-zero-sum games on the unit square, with payoff functions F₁(x,y) concave in x for each y, and/or F₂(x,y) concave in y for each x. For these games it is shown that there are Nash equilibria in players' strategies with supports consisting of at most two points. Also a simple search procedure for such Nash equilibria is given.
On winning fast in Avoider-Enforcer games.
On ɛ-optimal strategies in discounted Markov games
On β-favorability of the strong Choquet game
In the main result, partially answering a question of Telgársky, the following is proven: if X is a first countable R₀-space, then player β (i.e. the EMPTY player) has a winning strategy in the strong Choquet game on X if and only if X contains a nonempty -subspace which is of the first category in itself.
One pile Nim with arbitrary move function.
One-pile misère Nim for three or more players.
One-point solutions obtained from best approximation problems for cooperative games
In this paper we focus on one-point (point-valued) solutions for transferable utility games (TU-games). Since each allocated profit vector is identified with an additive game, a solution can be regarded as a mapping which associates an additive game with each TU-game. Recently Kultti and Salonen proposed a minimum norm problem to find the best approximation in the set of efficient additive games for a given TU-game. They proved some interesting properties of the obtained solution. However, they...
On-line Ramsey theory.
Open topics in fuzzy coalitional games with transferable utility
Vagueness is one of the phenomena which cannot be separated from the real bargaining and cooperative situations. The aim of this paper is to offer a brief survey of the recent state-of-art of the modelling of vagueness in coalitional games with transferable utility. It may be recognized in two components of these games, namely, in vague structure of coalitions where each player may simultaneously participate in several of them, and in vague expectations of coalitional pay-offs. Both these cases...
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium solutions for multistage games
Optimal decision rules
Optimal Penney Ante strategy via correlation polynomial identities.
Optimal risk sharing as a cooperative game
The problem of choosing an optimal insurance policy for an individual has recently been better understood, particularly due to the papers by Gajek and Zagrodny. In this paper we study its multi-agent version: we assume that insureds cooperate with one another to maximize their utility function. They create coalitions by bringing their risks to the pool and purchasing a common insurance contract. The resulting outcome is divided according to a certain rule called strategy. We address the fundamental...