In this paper we study some properties concerning the equilibrium point of a bimatrix game and describe a geometric method to obtain all the equilibria of a bimatrix game when one of the players has at most three pure strategies.
The paper concerns a two-level hierarchical game, where the players on each level behave noncooperatively. In this way one can model eg an oligopolistic market with several large and several small firms. We derive two types of necessary conditions for a solution of this game and discuss briefly the possibilities of its computation.
We present a very simple proof of the existence of the value for 'Big Match' first shown by Blackwell and Ferguson (1968).
In this short note, we investigate the framework where agents or players have some uncertainties upon their payoffs or losses, the behavior (or the type, number or any other characteristics) of other players. More specifically, we introduce an extension of the concept of Nash equilibria that generalize different solution concepts called by their authors, and depending on the context, either as robust, ambiguous, partially specified or with uncertainty aversion. We provide a simple necessary and...