Evolutionary distributions in adaptive space.
The G-function formalism has been widely used in the context of evolutionary games for identifying evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). This formalism was developed for and applied to point processes. Here, we examine the G-function formalism in the settings of spatial evolutionary games and strategy dynamics, based on reaction-diffusion models. We start by extending the point process maximum principle to reaction-diffusion models with homogeneous, locally stable surfaces. We then develop...
We apply Coevolutionary Temporal Difference Learning (CTDL) to learn small-board Go strategies represented as weighted piece counters. CTDL is a randomized learning technique which interweaves two search processes that operate in the intra-game and inter-game mode. Intra-game learning is driven by gradient-descent Temporal Difference Learning (TDL), a reinforcement learning method that updates the board evaluation function according to differences observed between its values for consecutively visited...
This paper deals with two-person stochastic games of resource extraction under both the discounted and the mean payoff criterion. Under some concavity and additivity assumptions concerning the payoff and the transition probability function a stationary Nash equilibrium is shown to exist. The proof is based on Schauder-Tychonoff's fixed point theorem, applied to a suitable payoff vector space.
In this paper, which is an extension of [4], we first show the existence of solutions to a class of Min Sup problems with linked constraints, which satisfy a certain property. Then, we apply our result to a class of weak nonlinear bilevel problems. Furthermore, for such a class of bilevel problems, we give a relationship with appropriate d.c. problems concerning the existence of solutions.
1991 AMS Math. Subj. Class.:Primary 54C10; Secondary 54F65We provide both a spectral and an internal characterizations of arbitrary !-favorable spaces with respect to co-zero sets. As a corollary we establish that any product of compact !-favorable spaces with respect to co-zero sets is also !-favorable with respect to co-zero sets. We also prove that every C* -embedded !-favorable with respect to co-zero sets subspace of an extremally disconnected space is extremally disconnected.
In parliaments elected by proportional systems the seats are allocated to the elected political parties roughly proportionally to the shares of votes for the party lists. Assuming that members of the parliament representing the same party are voting together, it has sense to require that distribution of the influence of the parties in parliamentary decision making is proportional to the distribution of seats. There exist measures (so called voting power indices) reflecting an ability of each party...
The computation of leastcore and prenucleolus is an efficient way of allocating a common resource among n players. It has, however, the drawback being a linear programming problem with 2n - 2 constraints. In this paper we show how, in the case of convex production games, generate constraints by solving small size linear programming problems, with both continuous and integer variables. The approach is extended to games with symmetries (identical players), and to games with partially continuous...
A well-known result in public economics is that capital income should not be taxed in the long run. This result has been derived using necessary optimality conditions for an appropriate dynamic Stackelberg game. In this paper we consider three models of dynamic taxation in continuous time and suggest a method for calculating their feedback Nash equilibria based on a sufficient condition for optimality. We show that the optimal tax on capital income is generally different from zero.
We continue the efforts to characterize winning strategies in various infinite games involving filters on the natural numbers in terms of combinatorial or structural properties of the given filter. Previous results in the literature included those games where player II responded with natural numbers, or finite subsets of natural numbers. In this paper we concentrate on games where player II responds with members of the dual ideal. We also give a summary of known results on filter games.
Drawing on an analogy with temporal fixpoint logic, we relate the arithmetic fixpoint definable sets to the winning positions of certain games, namely games whose winning conditions lie in the difference hierarchy over . This both provides a simple characterization of the fixpoint hierarchy, and refines existing results on the power of the game quantifier in descriptive set theory. We raise the problem of transfinite fixpoint hierarchies.
Drawing on an analogy with temporal fixpoint logic, we relate the arithmetic fixpoint definable sets to the winning positions of certain games, namely games whose winning conditions lie in the difference hierarchy over . This both provides a simple characterization of the fixpoint hierarchy, and refines existing results on the power of the game quantifier in descriptive set theory. We raise the problem of transfinite fixpoint hierarchies.
Dans cet article, nous présentons les aspects essentiels de la modélisation du processus décisionnel des joueurs de tennis dans une phase particulière de ce jeu sportif : le service-retour. Notre démarche se focalise sur la représentation des connaissances s'exerçant dans un continuum temporel scindé en micro-cycles et sur la construction de structures permettant d'envisager l'auto-apprentissage des caractéristiques technico-tactiques des joueurs par le système. Elle s'appuie sur la mise en oeuvre...