Potential-based strategies for tic-tac-toe on the integer lattice with numerous directions.
Using players’ Shapley–Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and account is more egalitarian than voting by account. In this paper, we show that a stronger shift in power takes place when the voting power of players is measured by their Shapley–Shubik indices. Moreover, we prove that analogous power shifts also occur with respect to the absolute Banzhaf and the absolute Johnston power indices.
The classical theory of the sex-ratio evolution, known as the sex-ratio game, is based on the maximization of the number of grandchildren, treated as a fitness measure of a female producing offspring of the sex ratio that is coded in her genes. The theory predicts that it is more profitable to produce offspring with less numerous sex. We can find in the literature mutually exclusive conclusions based on this prediction: some textbooks say that populations with the equal number of sons and daughters...
Considered here are production (or market) games with transferable utility. Prime objects are explicitly computable core solutions, or somewhat "deficit" versions of such, fully defined by shadow prices. Main arguments revolve around standard Lagrangian duality. A chief concern is to relax, or avoid, the commonplace assumption that all preferences and production possibilities be convex. Doing so, novel results are obtained about non-emptiness of the core, and about specific imputations therein.
In this paper the theoretical and practical implications of dropping -from the basic Bayesian coherence principles- the assumption of comparability of every pair of acts is examined. The resulting theory is shown to be still perfectly coherent and has Bayesian theory as a particular case. In particular we question the need of weakening or ruling out some of the axioms that constitute the coherence principles; what are their practical implications; how this drive to the notion of partial information...
This paper examines implications of different random recognition rules used to select proposal-makers on the payoffs of players participating in a weighted majority game. In particular, incentives to strategically alter the set of players by strategic splits or mergers are investigated.
This paper presents a new lower bound for the recursive algorithm for solving parity games which is induced by the constructive proof of memoryless determinacy by Zielonka. We outline a family of games of linear size on which the algorithm requires exponential time.
This paper presents a new lower bound for the recursive algorithm for solving parity games which is induced by the constructive proof of memoryless determinacy by Zielonka. We outline a family of games of linear size on which the algorithm requires exponential time.