On the first occurrence of strings.
We introduce a type of isomorphism among strategic games that we call local isomorphism. Local isomorphisms is a weaker version of the notions of strong and weak game isomorphism introduced in [J. Gabarro, A. Garcia and M. Serna, Theor. Comput. Sci. 412 (2011) 6675–6695]. In a local isomorphism it is required to preserve, for any player, the player’s preferences on the sets of strategy profiles that differ only in the action selected by this player. We show that the game isomorphism problem for...
We modify a game due to Berner and Juhász to get what we call “the open-open game (of length ω)”: a round consists of player I choosing a nonempty open subset of a space X and II choosing a nonempty open subset of I’s choice; I wins if the union of II’s open sets is dense in X, otherwise II wins. This game is of interest for ccc spaces. It can be translated into a game on partial orders (trees and Boolean algebras, for example). We present basic results and various conditions under which I or II...
Some possibilities of fuzzification of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) are briefly investigated. The fuzzification based on the transformation of individual fuzzy TU game into a fuzzy class of (deterministic) TU games with their own specific solutions is discussed.
We consider the two-sided eigenproblem over max algebra. It is shown that any finite system of real intervals and points can be represented as spectrum of this eigenproblem.
The uniform competitive solutions (u.c.s.) are basically stable sets of proposals involving several coalitions which are not necessarily disjoint. In the general framework of NTU games, the uniform competitive solutions have been defined in two earlier papers of the author (Stefanescu [5]) and Stefanescu [6]). The general existence results cover most situations formalized in the framework of the cooperative game theory, including those when the coalitional function is allowed to have empty values....
This paper considers bimatrix games with matrices having concavity properties. The games described by such payoff matrices well approximate two-person non-zero-sum games on the unit square, with payoff functions F₁(x,y) concave in x for each y, and/or F₂(x,y) concave in y for each x. For these games it is shown that there are Nash equilibria in players' strategies with supports consisting of at most two points. Also a simple search procedure for such Nash equilibria is given.