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Conway's Games and Some of their Basic Properties

Robin Nittka (2011)

Formalized Mathematics

We formulate a few basic concepts of J. H. Conway's theory of games based on his book [6]. This is a first step towards formalizing Conway's theory of numbers into Mizar, which is an approach to proving the existence of a FIELD (i.e., a proper class that satisfies the axioms of a real-closed field) that includes the reals and ordinals, thus providing a uniform, independent and simple approach to these two constructions that does not go via the rational numbers and hence does for example not need...

Cooperación y defensa.

Francesc Carreras (1993)

Qüestiió

Se aplican conceptos y técnicas de la teoría de juegos cooperativos a problemas de decisión que afectan a la política de Defensa del país. El análisis permite evaluar las propuestas sobre procedimientos de votación cualificada presentadas al Consejo Europeo en la cumbre de Maastricht de diciembre de 1991. Se ponen así de manifiesto las implicaciones que supondría para la posición estratégica de España la inédita capacidad operativa concedida a la Comunidad por el tratado de unión política.

Cooperative fuzzy games extended from ordinary cooperative games with restrictions on coalitions

Atsushi Moritani, Tetsuzo Tanino, Keiji Tatsumi (2006)

Kybernetika

Cooperative games are very useful in considering profit allocation among multiple decision makers who cooperate with each other. In order to deal with cooperative games in practical situations, however, we have to deal with two additional factors. One is some restrictions on coalitions. This first factor has been taken into consideration through feasibility of coalitions. The other is partial cooperation of players. In order to describe this second factor, we consider fuzzy coalitions which permit...

Cooperative networks games with elastic demands

Alain Quilliot, Fatiha Bendali, Jean Mailfert (2007)

RAIRO - Operations Research

We present here a pricing model which is an extension of the cooperative game concept and which includes a notion of elastic demand. We present some existence results as well as an algorithm, and we conclude by discussing a specific problem related to network pricing.

Core solutions and nash equilibria in noncooperative games with a measure space of players

Sjur Didrik Flåm, Andrzej Wieczorek (2006)

Banach Center Publications

The paper deals with noncooperative games in which players constitute a measure space. Strategy profiles that are equal almost everywhere are assumed to have the same interactive effects. Under these circumstances we explore links between core solutions and Nash equilibria. Conditions are given which guarantee that core outcomes must be Nash equilibria and vice versa. The main contribution are results on nonemptieness of the core.

Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem

David M. Ramsey, Krzysztof Szajowski (2006)

Banach Center Publications

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments...

Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games

Sylvain Sorin, Cheng Wan (2013)

RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle

This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associated delegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and collects the sum of their payoffs in...

Denumerable Markov stopping games with risk-sensitive total reward criterion

Manuel A. Torres-Gomar, Rolando Cavazos-Cadena, Hugo Cruz-Suárez (2024)

Kybernetika

This paper studies Markov stopping games with two players on a denumerable state space. At each decision time player II has two actions: to stop the game paying a terminal reward to player I, or to let the system to continue it evolution. In this latter case, player I selects an action affecting the transitions and charges a running reward to player II. The performance of each pair of strategies is measured by the risk-sensitive total expected reward of player I. Under mild continuity and compactness...

Design of a Participatory Decision Making Agent Architecture Based on Argumentation and Influence Function – Application to a Serious Game about Biodiversity Conservation

Alessandro Sordoni, Jean-Pierre Briot, Isabelle Alvarez, Eurico Vasconcelos, Marta de Azevedo Irving, Gustavo Melo (2010)

RAIRO - Operations Research

This paper addresses an ongoing experience in the design of an artificial agent taking decisions and combining them with the decisions taken by human agents. The context is a serious game research project, aimed at computer-based support for participatory management of protected areas (and more specifically national parks) in order to promote biodiversity conservation and social inclusion. Its objective is to help various stakeholders (e.g., environmentalist, tourism operator) to collectively understand...

Deterministic Markov Nash equilibria for potential discrete-time stochastic games

Alejandra Fonseca-Morales (2022)

Kybernetika

In this paper, we study the problem of finding deterministic (also known as feedback or closed-loop) Markov Nash equilibria for a class of discrete-time stochastic games. In order to establish our results, we develop a potential game approach based on the dynamic programming technique. The identified potential stochastic games have Borel state and action spaces and possibly unbounded nondifferentiable cost-per-stage functions. In particular, the team (or coordination) stochastic games and the stochastic...

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